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  Abstract 
 
     This study uses four types of boards-Caretaker, Statutory, Proactive and 
Participative to explore whether corporate governance mechanisms play essential roles 
in investment decisions (stock prices and financial distress).  Further, we use corporate 
control types (management-controlled firms and owner-controlled firms) to examine 
the above effects to know whether strong corporate governance mechanisms can 
facilitate to investment decisions.  The findings show that corporate governance 
mechanisms can affect investment decisions.  Owner-controlled firms get more 
positive stock evaluation and are less likely to get into financial distress than 
management-controlled firms, revealing that firms adopting good corporate governance 
practices can get positive evaluation from the perspective of investors.  
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Investment decisions. 
 
. InⅠ troduction 
 
Corporate governance in Taiwan does not have a long history, which has been 
emphasized by Taiwanese government in recent years.  However, corporate 
governance has become a familiar term for everyone.  After a series of irregular 
accounting scandals all around the world revealed, people aware that corporate 
governance is vital to the operations of firms and is relevant to stakeholders’ interest.  
Agency theory is often been regarded as the beginning discussion on corporate 
governance.  This is because corporate governance mechanisms can reduce agency 
problems between managers and shareholders and thus can reduce agency cost.  Kenis 
(2001) reviews corporate governance literature and indicates that firms can offer 
important incentive alignment to managers to act with shareholders’ interest.  Building 
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strong corporate governance systems can help firms to alleviate agency problems.     
Corporate governance mechanisms can be grouped into internal (e.g., the board) 
and external (e.g., the market for corporate control and the managerial labor market) 
corporate governance mechanisms.  The directors of the board are responsible for the 
conduct of a firm’s normal operation and are authorized to monitor the management 
(Conyon and Peck, 1998).  The market for corporate control is a kind of threat of 
takeover for firms (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987) and managerial labor market 
punishes managers once they make self-serving decisions and thus harm their 
reputation (Manne, 1965).  There are many benefits for firms to develop good 
corporate governance structures.  La Porta et al., (2000) provide good support that 
implementing good corporate governance practices can increase firm competitiveness, 
which are crucial factors to well-developed financial markets and good firm value.  
Many research documents that there is positive link between corporate governance 
mechanisms and stock return (Mitton, 2002; Gompers et al., 2003).  Mitton (2002) 
find that the stock markets in some East Asian countries have positive reactions to 
strong corporate governance.  Gompers et al. (2003) evidence that purchasing the 
investment portfolios with good corporate governance get higher return than 
purchasing those with bad corporate governance.  The evidence suggests that 
investors would like to purchase stocks of firms executing strong corporate governance 
practices.  On the contrary, weak corporate governance mechanisms have negative 
effects on firms.  Prior studies find that firms with bad corporate governance structure 
are likely to have financial difficulties and may thus go bankruptcy (Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985; Lee and Yeh, 2004).  Lee and Yeh (2004) indicate that firms with bad 
corporate governance structure have more probability of falling into financial distress, 
the conclusion of which remains when firms are in good financial condition.   
Although prior research shows that there are links between corporate governance 
and stock return and financial distress, it ignores to explore differential effects between 
different types of corporate governance mechanisms and different financial condition.  
Based on the above, this study attempts to extend the above research issues.  We use 
four types of boards—Caretaker, Statutory, Proactive and Participative, suggested by 
Pearce and Zahra (1991) to explore corporate governance mechanisms, which are 
grouped by the relative power of the CEO and the board.  The boards of Caretaker and 
Proactive governance mechanisms have lower power.  The CEOs in firms with 
Caretaker corporate governance mechanisms do not hold power due to a shift in power 
distribution among the CEO and top managers.  However, the CEOs in firms with 
Statutory corporate governance mechanism are powerful to affect key decisions of 
firms.  The number of outside directors in Caretaker and Statutory corporate 
governance mechanisms is less than that of Proactive and Participative corporate 
governance mechanisms.  The boards of Proactive and Participative corporate 
governance mechanisms have high power.  The major difference between Proactive 
and Participative corporate governance mechanisms is that the CEO of Participative 
corporate governance mechanism also holds power.  Based on the above, Caretaker 
and Statutory corporate governance mechanisms are weaker governance mechanisms 
than Proactive and Participative corporate governance mechanisms.  
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The separation of ownership and the management leads corporate control types to 
change from owner-controlled firms to management-controlled firms (Berle and Means, 
1932).  The governance behavior of managers between these corporate control types is 
different. Managers in management-controlled firms incline to make self-serving 
decisions and thus often ignore shareholders’ interest (Monsen and Downs, 1965).  
This implies that owner-controlled firms might provide better protection on 
shareholders’ interest.  The classification of corporate control types is according to the 
shareholding of an individual or a party in an organization (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 
1989).  As corporate governance mechanisms proposed by Pearce and Zahra (1991) 
are grouped by governance power of CEO and the board and shareholding is one of 
major source of governance power (Daily and Cannella, 2003), we group Caretaker and 
Statutory corporate governance mechanisms into management-controlled firms and 
group Proactive and Participative corporate governance mechanisms into 
owner-controlled firms.  By the way, we can examine whether good corporate 
governance mechanisms have positive effects on stock prices and have negative effects 
on the probability of falling into financial distress further. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as the following.  The literature review 
and hypotheses are discussed in Section , followed by descriptions of the research Ⅱ
framework and the methodology in Section , Ⅲ and the results and analyses in Section 
.  The last section highlights the primary research findings, including the Ⅳ
conclusions, the limitations and the recommendations.  
 
. Literature Review and HypothesesⅡ  
 
Agency theory offers a good explanation why corporate governance is so 
important.   It hypothesizes that there is interest conflict between managers and 
shareholders.  Managers have self-interest motive to make self-serving decisions and 
thus might harm shareholders’ interest.  Corporate governance provides strong 
protection on shareholders’ interest.  Much research has recognized that corporate 
governance can help firms to reduce agency problems (Daily and Cannella, 2003).  
The board has been regarded a major corporate governance mechanism.  The directors 
of the board are often selected because of their expertise and their familiarity with the 
operating activities of firms or their networks with outside parties.  The board is 
authorized to examine managerial decisions thoroughly and is responsible for making 
managerial compensation and monitoring top management teams (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996).  According to the above, shareholders would highlight how firms 
implement their governance practices.  The stock performance reveals how investors 
evaluate firms.  Many studies find corporate governance is positively related to stock 
return (Mitton, 2002; Gompers et al., 2003).  For example, Mitton (2002) evidences 
that there is positive association between corporate governance (ownership structure) 
and stock return for firms in East Asian countries.  This implies that investors would 
highlight good corporate governance practices when purchasing stocks.   
On the contrary, bad corporate governance mechanisms lead negative effects to 
firms. The most significant one is that firms may fall into financial distress and then go 
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bankruptcy (Lee and Yeh, 2004).  There is no doubt that corporate governance is an 
essential indicator to judge firm health.  Two parties in a firm are relevant to firm 
governance: the board and managers.  Prior literature has widely explored how the 
structure or the composition of the two parties links to financial failure: financial 
distress or bankruptcy of firms.  For example, Mizruchi (1983) explores how the 
board composition affects bankruptcy.  Sheppard (1994) examines the relation 
between the structure of top management teams and firm bankruptcy.  These studies 
suggest that more percentage of outside directors can increase the effectiveness of the 
board and the leadership of the chairman and the CEO should be separated.  This also 
points out that corporate governance is crucial to firms’ survival.  
From the above, corporate governance might affect investment decisions.  
However, there is a need to examine how the quality of corporate governance links to 
investment decisions further.  Pearce and Zahra (1991) indicate that Caretaker and 
Statutory are weaker governance mechanisms than Proactive and Participative.  
Besides, Caretaker and Statutory governance mechanisms can be classified into 
management-controlled firms, which managers seek to maximize personal income 
(Monsen and Downs, 1965).  Hence, we propose the following hypothesis. 
H1   Corporate governance mechanisms (Caretaker, Statutory, Proactive and 
Participative) have significant effects on stock prices.  Stock prices in 
owner-controlled firms are higher than management-controlled firms. 
H2   Corporate governance mechanisms (Caretaker, Statutory, Proactive and 
Participative) have significant effects on the probability of falling into financial 
distress.  The probability of falling into financial distress in 
management-controlled firms is higher than owner-controlled firms.  
 
. Ⅲ Research Framework and Methodology 
 
3.1 Research Framework 
This study investigates whether corporate governance mechanisms have 
significant effects on investment decisions--stock prices and the probability of falling 
into financial distress.  Further, this study examines whether owner-controlled firms 
have better effects on these investment decisions than management-controlled firms.  
Our research framework is shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investment Decisions 
Stock Prices 
Corporate Control Types 
Management-Controlled Firms 
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Figure 1  Research Framework 
 
3.2 Experimental and Questionnaire Design 
This study adopts the experimental method.  The experiment uses a 
between-subjects design.  This kind of experimental design is a different set of 
subjects appears in every treatment condition, and each subject is exposed to only one 
treatment condition (Schepanski et al., 1992).  This experiment includes eight 
experimental groups.  There are 30 persons in each group and the total number is 240.  
Codes—E1, E2, E3, and E4 (E5, E6, E7 and E8）are individually used as proxies for 
Caretaker, Statutory, Proactive and Participative governance mechanisms in the 
scenario of good (bad) financial condition.   
This experiment chooses the Liquid Crystal Displays (LCD) industry as a 
surveyed one and uses a virtual name “EAP” rather than a real name of a firm in each 
group. The backgrounds of this fictitious company “EAP” are presented, including its 
main introductions, the firm’s and industry financial indicators.  Then, this paper 
displays a two-year comparative simple balance sheet and income statement.  Next, 
corporate governance features (Caretaker, Statutory, Proactive, and Participative) are 
individually presented in different experimental groups.  This experiment uses two 
dimensions to manipulate the features of corporate governance mechanisms.  The 
board dimension includes board structure composition and qualitative factors.  The 
CEO & the management dimension include the descriptions concerning the structure of 
CEO and the management and how they use their governance power.   
After the subjects read the above information, this experiment firstly starts 
manipulation checks on financial information and on the features of corporate 
governance mechanisms and tests corporate governance concepts.  Then, we ask the 
subjects to answer the items pertaining to investment decisions--stock prices and the 
probability of falling into financial distress.  Next, the subjects have to decide the 
importance of financial information for investment decisions.  Finally, they have to 
answer the items related to personal profiles.   
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3.3 Data Analyses for the Subjects 
The subjects are 240 people who have investment experience in Taiwan, including 
such as EMBA students and auditors of CPA firms.  Most of the subjects are male and   
are between 30 to 39 years old (49.6%).  A majority of subjects have a bachelor 
degree (52.9%).  The main reference source for making investment decisions is the 
internet.  The other sources are recommendations from their relatives and friends, TV 
lines, company insiders, and books and magazines.   
3.4 Variable Definition 
The independent variables are measured by manipulating features of corporate 
governance mechanisms proposed by Pearce and Zahra (1991).  Caretaker governance 
mechanism lacks the appropriate mix of desirable director qualities and can’t serve as a 
credible element of corporate governance.  Statutory governance mechanism often 
functions as a “rubber stamp” of managerial decisions and cannot thoroughly examine 
managerial decisions.  For Proactive governance mechanism to exist, it must usually 
be composed primarily of outside directors.  Its directors’ responsibilities are divided 
among established committees.  The leadership of Participative governance 
mechanism is most likely to be separated from that of the board with outside directors 
constituting a majority of board membership.   
Further, we group these corporate governance mechanisms into 
management-controlled firms (Caretaker and Statutory) and owner-controlled firms 
(Proactive and Participative).  It is important to investigate the effects of different 
corporate control types on investment decisions as managers of management-controlled 
firms have more discretionary power and thus have more selfish behavior.  This study 
adopts regression analysis to examine the hypotheses.  We use three dummy variables 
to measures four corporate governance mechanisms.  Statutory governance 
mechanism (Proactive; Participative) equals to 1 if the firm adopts this corporate 
governance mechanism and 0 otherwise.  Corporate control types are dummy 
variables, which equal to 1 if they are owner-controlled firms and 0 otherwise.  
While investment decisions might be affected by the importance investors weight 
on financial information and their personal profiles (age and educational level), we also 
include these variables in the regression models.  The item measurement of the 
importance of financial information for investment decisions is ranging from 1 equal to 
the least important of financial information for investment decisions to 7 equal to the 
most important of financial information for investment decisions. The age and 
educational level of investors are dummy variables.  The age above 40 years old 
equals to 1 and it equals to 0 if the age is between 20 and 39 years old.  The 
educational level equals to 1 if it is a master’s or a doctor’s degree and it equals to 0 if 
the educational level is a bachelor’s degree.  Pertaining to dependent variables, we ask 
the subjects freely to answer how much the stock price of the firm and to predict the 
probability of falling into financial distress of the firm, the range of which is between 
0~ 100%. 
.The Results for AnalysesⅣ  
4.1 Manipulation Checks and the Test for Corporate Governance Concepts 
The manipulation checks use Likert seven-point scale, ranging from 1 = very 
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disagree to 7 = very agree, which include two parts--financial information and features 
of corporate governance mechanisms.  Several items adopt adverse manipulation.  
There are three items to manipulate financial information.  The sample item is “the 
operating revenue in this year compared to last year is growing up”.  The MANOVA 
results show that the items in the scenario of good financial condition are higher than 
that in bad one (p < 0.01).  This shows that the manipulations on financial information 
are successful. 
This study also manipulates corporate governance mechanisms, encompassing 
two dimensions: the board dimension and the dimension of the CEO & the 
management.  There are three items related to the board dimension.  Sample item is 
“there is more percentage of outside directors in the board”.  Two items are used to 
manipulate the dimension of the CEO & the management.  Sample item is “the CEO 
has the power to make major firm decisions and has equal or more than a 5 percent 
holding”.  Duncan’s range test shows that corporate governance mechanisms are 
manipulated successfully and all the items have significantly differences (p<0.01).  
The results show that the manipulations on the features of corporate governance 
mechanisms are successful.   
There are five items to test corporate governance concepts.  The sample item is 
“the management should assure that shareholders have the right to fully realize, 
participate and make decisions in important company affairs”.  There are no 
significant differences among corporate governance mechanisms on the items, showing 
that the subjects know what corporate governance is.  
4.2 The results 
In order to know the potential association between the variables, we adopt 
correlation analysis, displayed in Table 1.  All correlation coefficient values are below 
0.8, implying that there should no collinearity problems exist.  As expected, there is 
significant relation between corporate governance mechanisms and stock prices and the 
probability of falling into financial distress.  
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Stockprices Findistress Statutory Proactive Participative Finimportant Age Education Contypes
ock prices 1         
ndistress -0.619*** 1        
tatutory -0.182*** 0.278*** 1       
roactive 0.121* -0.128** -0.333*** 1      
articipative 0.159** -0.276*** -0.333***-0.333*** 1     
inimportant 0.023 0.002 0.083 -0.084 -0.004 1    
Age 0.191*** -0.153** 0.036 -0.059 0.107* -0.078 1   
ducation 0.034 -0.013 -0.101 -0.101 0.149** -0.005 -0.011 1 1 
ontypes 0.242*** -0.350*** -0.577*** 0.577*** 0.577** -0.076 0.041 0.042 1 
Notes: 1. Variable definition: Stock prices = stock prices; Findistress = the probability of falling into financial distress; 
Statutory (Proactive; Participative) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm adopts Statutory corporate 
governance mechanism (Proactive; Participative) and 0 otherwise. Finimportant = the importance of financial 
information for investment decisions.  It ranges from 1 equals to the least important of financial information for 
investment decisions to 7 equals to the most important of financial information for investment decisions; Age = the 
age of investors, which equals to 1 if it is above 40 years old and it equals to 0 if the age is between 20 and 39 
years old.  Education = the educational level of investors, which equals to 1 if it is a master’s or a doctor’s degree 
and it equals to 0 if it is a bachelor’s degree. Contypes = corporate control types, which equal to 1 if corporate 
control types are owner-controlled firms and equal to 0 if they are management-controlled types. 
    2. *p＜0.1; **p＜0.05; ***p＜0.01. 
Table 1  Correlation matrix (Pearson coefficients) 
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4.3 The Results for Hypotheses  
This study runs multiple regression analysis to examine further relation 
between variables.  Hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 are used to examine 
whether corporate governance mechanisms (Caretaker, Statutory, Proactive and 
Participative) have effects on investment decisions (stock prices and the 
probability of falling into financial distress).  Further, we also examine whether 
corporate control types—management-controlled firms and owner-controlled 
firms have effects on the above investment decisions.  The results related to 
corporate governance mechanisms and corporate control types in different 
financial condition—good and bad are individually reported in Panel A and 
Panel B of Table 2 and Table 3.   
Pertaining to the results of H1, in good financial condition, Panel A of 
Table 2 shows that the regression model is significant (F=3.695, p＜0.01).  
Caretaker corporate governance mechanism has more significant effects on 
stock prices than Statutory (t=-1.855, p＜0.1).  Also, when compared to 
Caretaker corporate governance mechanism, Proactive corporate governance 
mechanism has more significant effects on stock prices (t=1.760, p＜0.1).  
There is positive association between the importance of financial information 
for investment decisions and stock prices, showing that financial information is 
vital to select stocks (t=2.302, p＜0.05).  
In bad financial condition, Panel B of Table 2 indicates that the regression 
model is significant (F=3.521, p＜0.01).  The results reveal that Proactive and 
Participative corporate governance mechanisms have more significant effects 
on stock prices than Caretaker corporate governance mechanism (t=2.526, p＜
0.05; t=3.786, p＜0.01).  As expected, our results reveal that corporate 
governance mechanisms have effects on stock prices.  From the above and 
based on the average scores of each corporate governance mechanism (not 
displayed), Proactive and Participative corporate governance mechanisms have 
better performance than the others no matter whether financial condition is 
good or bad.  All the values of VIF (Variance inflation factor) are smaller than 
5 and CI (Condition index) are smaller than 30, representing that 
multicollinearity can be dismissed as a threat to the results (Studenmund, 2001).  
In addition, the values of all DW (Durbin-Watson) are closed to 2, revealing 
that residual autocorrelation does not exist.   
On the other hand, Panel A and Panel B of Table 3 point out that the 
regression models are significant in both financial condition—good and bad 
(F=4.518, p ＜ 0.01; F=4.762, p ＜ 0.01).  Owner-controlled firms have 
significantly positive effects on stock prices in good and bad financial condition 
(t=3.417, p＜0.01; t=3.968, p＜0.01).  In consistent with Monsen and Downs 
(1965), while managers in management-controlled firms prefer to make 
self-serving decisions, their stock evaluation is lower.  Concerning the 
importance of financial information for investment decisions, investors put 
emphasis on financial information when purchasing stocks in good financial 
condition (t=2.202, p＜0.05).  When examining the regression models related 
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to stock prices, VIF, CI and DW are also in accepted ranges.         
Regarding the results of H2, in good financial condition, Panel A of Table 
2 shows that the regression model is significant (F=11.738, p＜0.01).  The 
results indicate that Caretaker corporate governance mechanism has more 
significant effects on the probability of falling into financial distress than 
Proactive and Participative (t=-2.219, p＜0.05; t=-2.820, p＜0.01).  Statutory 
corporate governance mechanism has more significant effects on the probability 
of falling into financial distress than Caretaker corporate governance 
mechanism (t=3.793, p＜0.01).  In addition, investors do not emphasize on 
financial information of firms in good financial condition when making 
investment decisions (t=-2.391,p＜0.05).  The results also point out that 
investors with higher educational level are more conservative in making 
judgment (t=2.686, p＜0.01).   
In bad financial condition, Panel B of Table 2 shows that the regression 
model is significant (F=3.456, p＜0.01). The findings reveal that Caretaker 
corporate governance mechanism has significantly higher effects on the 
probability of falling into financial distress than Proactive and Participative 
corporate governance mechanisms (t=-1.998, p＜0.05; t=-3.591, p＜0.01).  All 
the values of VIF, CI and DW are in reasonable ranges.  Hence, there are no 
collinearity problems and no serial correlation in residual.   
On the other hand, Panel A and Panel B of Table 3 shows that regression 
models are significant in both financial condition—good and bad (F=12.524, p
＜0.01; F=4.484, p＜0.01).  Management-controlled types have significantly 
positive effects on the probability of falling into financial distress in good and 
bad financial condition (t=-6.089, p＜0.01; t=-3.740, p＜0.01).  In consistent 
with the findings of Lee and Yeh (2004), firms with weak corporate governance 
practices have more probability of getting into financial distress.  Concerning 
the importance of financial information for investment decisions, investors 
incline to ignore financial information of firms in good financial condition 
when evaluating whether firms have financial distress (t=-2.336, p＜0.05).  
Besides, investors with higher educational level have more conservative attitude 
in judging firm health (t=1.996, p＜0.05).  All VIF, CI and DW are in accepted 
ranges.    
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Table 2  The Effects of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Investment Decisions 
Stock Prices (The Probability of Falling into Financial Distress) 
 = α+β1Statutory + β2Proactive + βb3Participative +β4 Finimportant + β5Age+β6Education 
Panel A: Good Financial Condition 
   
Stock Prices 
The Probability of Falling 
 into Financial Distress 
Variables  Predicted sign  Coefficient T-statistic  Predicted sign Coefficient   T-statistic 
Constant  ?   0.950 ?     4.279*** 
Statutory  ?  -0.199 -1.855* ? 0.349  3.793***
Proactive  +  0.189 1.760* － -0.205  -2.219** 
Participative  +  0.122 1.126 － -0.262  -2.820***
Finimportant  ?  0.201 2.302** ? -0.179  -2.391** 
Age  ?  0.112 1.263 ? -0.101  -1.330 
Education  ?  -0.052 -0.586 ? 0.203  2.686*** 
Adjusted R2    0.120  0.351 
Max VIF    1.578  1.578 
Max CI    19.424  19.424 
Durbin-Watson    1.667  1.893 
F-statistic    3.695***  11.738*** 
Panel B: Bad Financial Condition 
   
Stock Prices 
The Probability of Falling 
 into Financial Distress 
Variables  Predicted sign  Coefficient T-statistic  Predicted sign Coefficient   T-statistic 
Constant  ?   0.898  ?     3.406***
Statutory  ?   0.062 0.578 ? -0.015  -0.140 
Proactive  +  0.267 2.526** － -0.212  -1.998** 
Participative  +   0.408 3.786*** － -0.388  -3.591***
Finimportant  ?   0.021 0.233 ?  0.006  0.065 
Age  ?  -0.125 -1.444 ? 0.094  1.088 
Education  ?   0.014 0.152 ? -0.051  -0.572 
Adjusted R2    0.113  0.110 
Max VIF    1.558  1.558 
Max CI    22.546  22.546 
Durbin-Watson    1.913  2.214 
F-statistic    3.521***   3.456*** 
Notes: 1. Variable definition: Statutory (Proactive; Participative) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm adopts 
Statutory corporate governance mechanism (Proactive; Participative) and otherwise 1. Finimportant = the 
importance of financial information for investment decisions. It ranges from 1 equals to the least important 
of financial information for investment decisions to 7 equals to the most important of financial information 
for investment decisions; Age = the age of investors, which equals to 1 if it is above 40 years old and it 
equals to 0 if the age is between 20 and 39 years old. Education = the educational level of investors, which 
equals to 1 if it is a master’s or a doctor’s degree and it equals to 0 if it is a bachelor’s degree. 
      2. *p＜0.1; **p＜0.05; *** p＜0.01. 
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Table 3  The Effects of Corporate Control Types on Investment Decisions 
Stock Prices (The Probability of Falling into Financial Distress) 
 = α+β1Contypes +β4 Finimportant + β5Age+β6Education 
Panel A: Good Financial Condition 
   
Stock Prices 
The Probability of Falling 
 into Financial Distress 
Variables  Predicted sign  Coefficient T-statistic  Predicted sign Coefficient   T-statistic 
Constant  ?   0.710  ?     5.030***
Contypes  ＋  0.298 3.417*** － -0.476  -6.089***
Finimportant  ?  0.191 2.202** ? -0.182  -2.336** 
Age  ?  0.081 0.928 ? -0.073  -0.937 
Education  ?  -0.036 -0.419 ? 0.156  1.996** 
Adjusted R2    0.106  0.279 
Max VIF    1.010  1.010 
Max CI    18.529  18.529 
Durbin-Watson    1.625  1.652 
F-statistic    4.518***   12.524*** 
Panel B: Bad Financial Condition 
   
Stock Prices 
The Probability of Falling 
 into Financial Distress 
Variables  Predicted sign  Coefficient T-statistic  Predicted sign Coefficient   T-statistic 
Constant  ?   0.973 ?     3.350***
Contypes  ＋  0.352 3.968*** － -0.333  -3.740***
Finimportant  ?  0.021 0.238 ? 0.011  0.121 
Age  ?  -0.124 -1.430 ? 0.093  1.066 
Education  ?  0.031 0.349 ? -0.075  -0.854 
Adjusted R2    0.112   0.105 
Max VIF    1.054   1.054 
Max CI    21.893  21.893 
Durbin-Watson    1.881  2.169 
F-statistic    4.762***    4.484*** 
Notes: 1. Variable definition: Contypes = corporate control types, which equal to 1 if corporate control types are 
owner-controlled firms and equal to 0 if they are management-controlled types.  Finimportant = the importance of 
financial information for investment decisions. It ranges from 1 equals to the least important of financial information 
for investment decisions to 7 equals to the most important of financial information for investment decisions; Age = 
the age of investors, which equals to 1 if it is above 40 years old and it equals to 0 if the age is between 20 and 39 
years old.  Education = the educational level of investors, which equals to 1 if it is a master’s or a doctor’s degree 
and it equals to 0 if it is a bachelor’s degree. 
      2. *p＜0.1; **p＜0.05; *** p＜0.01. 
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.ConclusionsⅤ  
 
Corporate governance has been a focus in the global world.  It has been regarded 
as an essential way to enhance the evaluation of stock markets of firms. Taiwanese 
government has made efforts to strengthen firm governance.  In 2002, IPO firms have 
to set up at least two independent directors in the board.  This is not only because of 
time trend but also because of many Taiwanese accounting scandals in the recent years.  
Firms can bring positive outcome when they adopt good corporate governance 
practices (Daily and Cannella, 2003).  However, there is little research to explore the 
link between different corporate governance mechanisms and investment decisions.   
This paper focuses on stock prices and financial distress due to their importance 
for firms’ survival.  The findings show that corporate governance 
mechanisms—Caretaker, Statutory, Proactive and Participative boards have significant 
effects on stock prices and the probability of falling into financial distress.  In 
consistent with prior finding (Mitton, 2002; Lee and Yeh, 2004), the results indicate 
that corporate governance mechanisms significantly affect investment decisions.   
In order to examine the effects of the quality of corporate governance on 
investment decisions, this study investigates the above effects between different 
corporate control types: management-controlled firms and owner-controlled firms.  
The findings point out that the owner-controlled firms perform better than the 
management-controlled firms. The implication is that investors would take the quality 
of corporate governance into account when purchasing stocks and evaluating firm 
health.  Our findings are consistent with prior studies (Mitton, 2002; Lee and Yeh, 
2004).   
We suggest that corporate governance mechanisms are crucial to investment 
decisions.  Investors may regard firms with good corporate governance mechanisms 
can provide well-protection on them and therefore they prefer to purchase stocks of 
good-governed firms.  Furthermore, when managers and directors of the board pay 
attention to company affairs, firm operating activities would be well proceeded.  As a 
result, the firms emphasizing on corporate governance are unlikely to have financial 
distress.   
This limitation of the study is as follows.  We adopt the experimental method to 
measure the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on stock prices and financial 
distress, thus personal subjective biases might exist.  However, due to the advantage 
of experimental method, this study can reduce potential confound effects on our 
findings (Schepanski, 1992).  Future research can examine the differential effects of 
investment decisions between expected improved and existing governance mechanisms.  
This can facilitate to the understanding on whether there is a need to make 
improvement on these corporate governance practices and therefore reduce the cost of 
making law and regulation.    
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摘要 
 
     本文採用四種類型的董事會—看管型、法定型、主動型與參與型來探討公司
治理機制在投資決策(股價與財務危機發生機率)中扮演的角色。更進一步，我們使
用公司控制型態(管理者控制公司與所有者控制公司) 檢視上述效果，以瞭解是否
良好的公司治理機制能促進投資決策制定。本研究結果發現公司治理機制確實會
影響投資決策，且所有者控制公司能獲得較高的股價報酬與較不可能會發生財務
危機。本研究管理意涵為投資者會對採用健全的公司治理機制之企業有較佳的評
價。  
 
關鍵詞: 公司治理、投資決策 
 
 
